#ECommerce #ConsumerProtection #CompetitionLaw #DigitalCompetition #AlgorithmicTransparency
The 2026 amendments mark a significant shift in India’s approach to regulating digital marketplaces—but stop short of treating self-preferencing as a per se competition offence.
The Central Government has notified the Consumer Protection (E-Commerce) (Amendment) Rules, 2026, substantially updating the Consumer Protection (E-Commerce) Rules, 2020. The amendments, notified through G.S.R. 789(E) dated 9 September 2026, will come into force on 1 January 2027.
The amendments address a number of contemporary concerns associated with digital marketplaces: manipulation of search results, sponsored listings, artificial discounting, dark patterns, seller identification, grievance redressal, country-of-origin information and the use of consumer information.
For competition-law practitioners, however, the most interesting aspect of the new regime lies not merely in what the Government has added, but in what it has chosen not to add.
Readers may recall that during the Seminar held in April , 2025 in Singapore , I had addressed and monitored a panel discussion on the Emerging Competition Issues in Digital markets and E-commerce , wherein prominent issues like “self preferecng ” , “surge in rakning ” , “Expansion at the cost of profits” and ‘Platform neutrality ” were discussed . The Amendments in India’s new E-commerce rules seek to address at least some of these key issues , which is really a welcome initiative , both for restoring fair competition as well as for consumer pritection from unfair trade practices .
The amendments represent a significant movement towards algorithmic and platform transparency, but they stop short of creating a general prohibition on self-preferencing or abuse of dominance under the Consumer Protection framework.
From the 2021 draft to the 2026 Rules
The evolution of the E-Commerce Rules is particularly instructive.
The 2021 draft amendments had contemplated a considerably more interventionist regime. Among other things, the proposals sought to address abuse of dominant position, restrictions concerning related enterprises, preferential treatment and certain flash-sale practices. The proposals therefore came close to importing traditional competition-law concepts directly into the Consumer Protection Rules.
That approach raised an obvious institutional question: should questions of dominance and exclusionary conduct be dealt with by the consumer-protection regulator, or should they remain principally within the Competition Act and the jurisdiction of the Competition Commission of India (CCI)?
The 2026 amendments adopt a more calibrated approach.
Rather than declaring that a dominant marketplace cannot favour its own products, the new Rules focus on how ranking is determined, whether search results are manipulated, whether paid placement is disclosed, and whether consumers receive sufficient information to make an informed choice.
That distinction is fundamental.
1. Search ranking: transparency instead of outright platform neutrality
The most significant competition-law development may be the new treatment of ranking.
The amended Rules redefine “ranking” to cover the relative prominence or relevance given to sellers or to goods and services offered through a marketplace, irrespective of the technological means used to present, organise or communicate them.
More importantly, a new obligation prohibits an e-commerce entity from misleading users by manipulating search results or search indexes having regard to the user’s search query.
Marketplace entities must also provide an explanation of the main parameters, in descending order of importance, which individually or collectively are most significant in determining the ranking of goods or sellers, together with their relative importance. The explanation must be publicly accessible and drafted in plain and intelligible language.
This is an important move towards algorithmic accountability.
But it is not the same thing as algorithmic or platform neutrality.
The Rules do not say that a platform must give its own products exactly the same ranking treatment as products offered by third-party sellers. Nor do they expressly prohibit “self-preferencing”.
The legal question will therefore be whether a particular ranking practice amounts to impermissible manipulation that misleads the consumer, rather than whether the platform has merely preferred its own product.
2. Sponsored listings: drawing the line between ranking and advertising
The amended Rules require sponsored listings to be distinctly identified through clear and prominent disclosures.
This is a relatively simple proposition with potentially significant consequences.
Online marketplaces increasingly combine:
- organic search results.
- algorithmically ranked results;
- paid placements; and
- platform-owned or affiliated products.
For the consumer, these categories may not always be readily distinguishable.
The new rule seeks to ensure that a consumer knows when a product has obtained prominence because someone has paid for that prominence.
This is therefore primarily a consumer-transparency intervention, although it has an important competition dimension: paid placement can affect the visibility of competing sellers and thereby influence the competitive process on the platform.
3. Mandatory disclosure of “prior price” – To eliminate the misleading discounts – The “50% off” or the “BIG sales! Problem-
This is by far the most important and consumer friendly initiative.
The amendments also introduce a specific mechanism to address potentially misleading discount claims.
Where an e-commerce entity or seller announces a price reduction, it must display both the reduced price and the prior price.
The “prior price” is defined as the lowest price of the good or service during the preceding 30 days.
This is likely to have an immediate practical impact on online sales campaigns.
The provision seeks to prevent a familiar practice: temporarily increasing the price before a sale and subsequently presenting the reduction from that artificially increased price as a substantial discount.
Again, this is classic consumer-protection regulation rather than competition law—but it demonstrates the Government’s increasing willingness to regulate the architecture through which consumers make purchasing decisions.
4. Seller identity: making the marketplace/seller distinction visible
The amended Rules require the seller’s name to appear on the invoice in the same font size as the name of the e-commerce entity.
The change may appear cosmetic, but it addresses an important feature of marketplace commerce.
A consumer may purchase through a familiar platform while having little awareness of the identity of the actual seller responsible for the product.
The amendment reinforces the distinction between:
the marketplace platform and the underlying seller.
This is particularly relevant to complaints concerning defective goods, refunds, warranties and product authenticity.
5. Dark patterns become a continuing compliance obligation
The amended Rules expressly require e-commerce entities to comply with the Guidelines for Prevention and Regulation of Dark Patterns, 2023.
More significantly, every e-commerce entity must conduct a yearly self-audit to ensure that its platform is free from dark patterns and must prominently display a certificate to that effect.
This represents an important change in regulatory philosophy.
Dark patterns are no longer merely a matter of enforcement after a deceptive interface has been identified. Platforms are being placed under a continuing internal governance and compliance obligation.
In practical terms, e-commerce businesses will need to examine interface design, consent flows, cancellation processes, disclosures and other user journeys periodically rather than treating compliance as a one-off exercise.
6. Ranking transparency and the European experience
Interestingly, India’s approach has parallels with—but is materially different from—the European Union’s regulatory architecture.
The EU has long required online intermediaries to explain the principal parameters determining ranking. The EU framework recognises that providers need not disclose their algorithms themselves, but must provide an intelligible description of the principal ranking parameters and their relative importance.
The Digital Markets Act (DMA) goes further for designated gatekeepers.
Article 6(5) of the DMA prohibits gatekeepers from giving more favourable treatment in ranking and related indexing and crawling to their own products or services compared with similar products or services offered by third parties.
The contrast is therefore instructive:
| Issue | India — 2026 E-Commerce Rules | EU — DMA |
| Ranking transparency | Yes | Yes |
| Disclosure of principal ranking parameters | Yes | Yes, in relevant contexts |
| Sponsored listing disclosure | Yes | Addressed through broader digital-advertising transparency |
| Manipulative search results | Prohibited | Addressed through DMA/DSA framework |
| Self-preferencing | Not expressly prohibited per se | Expressly prohibited for designated gatekeepers |
| Abuse of dominance | Not created under E-Commerce Rules | DMA operates ex ante alongside competition law |
| General application | E-commerce entities within Rules | Designated gatekeepers/core platform services |
Thus, India’s 2026 Rules should not be described as an Indian equivalent of the DMA.
They are better understood as a consumer-protection and transparency layer that may interact with competition law.
7. The data question: a particularly interesting provision
The amendments also address the use of information collected by marketplace e-commerce entities.
A marketplace entity cannot use information collected by it for the direct or indirect sale of goods by a seller bearing a brand or name common with that of the marketplace entity. It also cannot use such information to promote or advertise a seller as being associated with the marketplace unless it has obtained the consumer’s express and affirmative consent for such use.
This provision deserves close attention.
The international competition debate concerning large marketplaces has repeatedly focused on whether the platform can use information generated by third-party sellers to compete against those very sellers through its own private-label or affiliated businesses.
The Indian provision does not, however, establish a general competition-law rule against the exploitation of marketplace data.
Its immediate legal architecture is one of consumer information, consent and unfair trade practices.
Whether it could nevertheless become relevant in a competition investigation will depend on the facts of the particular case.
8. Unrelated bundled fees
The Rules also prohibit marketplace e-commerce entities from collecting bundled fees from users for services unrelated to the e-commerce platform.
The prohibition contains an exception for loyalty or membership programmes and benefits, services, offers or incentives provided in connection with such programmes.
This is another example of the Government regulating the choice architecture of digital commerce rather than simply the underlying transaction.
9. Stronger seller and product disclosures
The amended Rules require greater disclosure concerning sellers and products.
Marketplace entities must provide information such as the seller’s business name, registration status, geographical address, customer-care number, website and email details where available, ratings or aggregated feedback and other information necessary for an informed pre-purchase decision.
Sellers must also provide relevant information concerning country of origin, best-before/use-before dates, returns, refunds, exchange, warranty, guarantee, delivery, shipment, return-shipping costs and payment modes.
The amendments additionally require disclosure of identification numbers issued by the Central Government, including GSTIN or MSME registration number, where applicable.
For imported goods, the e-commerce entity must disclose the importer and the full country of origin in accordance with the Legal Metrology framework.
10. The National Consumer Helpline
The amendments require every e-commerce entity to become a partner in the convergence process of the National Consumer Helpline (NCH).
They also require the grievance officer to provide the consumer with a copy of the complaint as recorded by the officer, while retaining the 48-hour acknowledgement and one-month redressal framework.
The Government has cited the scale of the problem: in 2025 the NCH received 17,71,622 grievances, of which 5,11,196—approximately 29%—related to e-commerce.
11. What happened to the competition-law proposals of 2021?
This may ultimately be the most significant policy question.
The 2021 proposals sought to address matters much closer to conventional competition regulation, including concerns over dominant platforms, related enterprises and preferential treatment.
The 2026 Rules do not reproduce a general prohibition on abuse of dominance.
Nor do they expressly say:
“A marketplace may not rank its own products more favourably than competing third-party products.”
Instead, the new framework asks:
Was the ranking manipulated? Was the consumer misled? Were the principal ranking parameters disclosed? Was paid placement identified?
That is a materially different regulatory philosophy.
12. Does this leave a regulatory gap?
Possibly—but it may be an intentional one.
India’s Committee on Digital Competition Law had recommended an ex-ante framework for large digital enterprises, with Systemically Significant Digital Enterprises (SSDEs) and obligations attached to specified Core Digital Services. The draft Digital Competition Bill, 2024 was designed to supplement, rather than replace, the Competition Act.
That broader architecture is much closer conceptually to the EU DMA than the 2026 E-Commerce Rules.
The Consumer Protection Rules therefore need not—and arguably should not—attempt to become a substitute for the Competition Act or future ex-ante digital competition legislation.
A useful way of viewing the regulatory architecture is:
Consumer Protection / CCPA
→ misleading conduct
→ dark patterns
→ price transparency
→ sponsored listings
→ ranking transparency
→ seller disclosure
CCI / Competition Act
→ dominance
→ exclusionary conduct
→ foreclosure
→ anti-competitive agreements
→ abuse of market power
Future ex-ante digital competition framework
→ systemic platform conduct
→ self-preferencing
→ anti-steering
→ gatekeeper obligations
→ contestability and fairness
The 2026 Rules therefore occupy the first layer, while potentially interacting with the second and third.
13. The real question: transparency or neutrality?
The central policy question emerging from the 2026 Rules can perhaps be put very simply:
Is transparency enough?
Suppose a dominant marketplace tells consumers:
“Our ranking algorithm gives greater weight to conversion rates, platform fulfilment, price and customer engagement.”
Suppose the platform’s own private-label products consistently score highly on those parameters.
Has the platform complied with the E-Commerce Rules?
Possibly yes—provided there is no prohibited manipulation or misleading conduct.
But from a competition perspective, another question remains:
Does the platform’s conduct disadvantage rival sellers because the platform is simultaneously the marketplace operator and a competing seller?
That is a different question.
The EU DMA answers it through an explicit ex-ante prohibition on self-preferencing for designated gatekeepers. India’s 2026 Consumer Protection Rules do not.
That distinction is likely to become increasingly important as Indian digital markets mature.
Conclusion–
The Consumer Protection (E-Commerce) (Amendment) Rules, 2026 are an important development in India’s digital regulatory framework. Their significance lies less in creating a new competition law for digital markets and more in bringing transparency and accountability into the architecture of online consumer choice. The Rules seek to ensure that consumers know:
- why products appear where they do;
- whether a listing is sponsored;
- what the genuine reference price for a discount is;
- who the actual seller is;
- whether an interface contains prohibited dark patterns;
- where an imported product comes from; and
- how their complaints are being handled.
At the same time, the Government has stopped short of declaring self-preferencing or abuse of dominance unlawful per se under consumer-protection law.
This leaves an important regulatory boundary intact.
The real test will come when a large marketplace’s algorithm simultaneously determines which competitors consumers see and whether the platform’s own products receive preferential treatment.
At that point, the question will no longer be merely one of consumer transparency.
It will become a question of competition, contestability and platform power.
And that is precisely where the future interaction between the CCPA, the CCI and India’s proposed ex-ante digital competition regime is likely to become most interesting.
The Consumer Protection (E-Commerce) (Amendment) Rules, 2026 were notified as G.S.R. 789(E) on 9 September 2026 and come into force on 1 January 2027.
#ECommerce #ConsumerProtection #CompetitionLaw #DigitalCompetition #AlgorithmicTransparency
