#CompetitionLaw #CCI #CompetitionCommissionOfIndia #Antitrust #Cartel #ConsumerProtection #DelhiHighCourt #CementIndustry #UltraTech
Can a “third party” join a competition law proceeding without the consent of the enterprise under investigation?
The Delhi High Court has answered yes — in appropriate circumstances.
In a significant judgment delivered on 8 September 2026, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in UltraTech Cement Ltd. v. Competition Commission of India & Anr., LPA 8/2024, upheld the participation of the Builders’ Association of India (BAI) in a suo motu proceeding before the Competition Commission of India (CCI).
The judgment raises an important question of competition procedure:
Who gets to participate in a CCI proceeding — and does the enterprise under investigation have a right to decide who comes before the Commission?
The answer lies in the fundamentally different character of competition law proceedings as compared with ordinary civil litigation.
The factual backdrop
The matter arose out of complaints received by the CCI between December 2018 and May 2019 alleging anti-competitive conduct by grey cement manufacturers, including allegations of cartelisation resulting in abnormal increases in cement prices. The CCI initiated a suo motu investigation under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act, 2002.
BAI, an all-India association representing builders and described by the Court as the largest consumer of cement, had itself made a complaint to the CCI in February 2019.
However, when BAI subsequently sought impleadment in December 2021, its application was rejected because the investigation before the Director General (DG) was already at an advanced stage. BAI challenged that rejection before the Delhi High Court. But by the time its challenge was considered, the DG had completed the investigation and submitted his report. The Single Judge , vide its judgment dated 26.09.2022 , therefore , held that BAI’s request to participate in the investigation stage had become infructuous. But importantly, BAI was given liberty to approach the CCI afresh under Regulation 25 of the CCI (General) Regulations, 2009, once the DG’s report came up for consideration. BAI did exactly that. Its fresh application was subsequently allowed by the CCI vide its order dated 05.07.2023 . The Commission found that BAI had a substantial interest in the outcome of the proceedings and permitted it to inspect the non-confidential record and present its opinion on the DG’s report.
UltraTech challenged that CCI order dated 05.07.2023 before the Delhi High Court and the Single Judge vide its judgment dated 18.12.2023 rejected the same, against which UltraTech filed the LPA No. 8/2024.
UltraTech’s four principal objections
UltraTech raised several important procedural objections before the High Court.
First, it argued that the CCI’s order was effectively a non-speaking order, because merely recording facts could not amount to giving reasons for permitting BAI to participate.
Second, UltraTech contended that BAI’s second application amounted to an impermissible review of the CCI’s earlier rejection order, particularly since the CCI had no power to review or recall its own order in the manner suggested.
Third, UltraTech invoked natural justice, arguing that it had not been afforded an opportunity of hearing before BAI was permitted to participate.
Finally, UltraTech argued that BAI was effectively a hostile party, and its participation could expose the company to access to sensitive material.
All four arguments failed.
Regulation 25 is the key
The Court’s analysis begins with Regulation 25(1) of the Competition Commission of India (General) Regulations, 2009., (“2009 Regulations”). The provision enables the CCI, upon a written application, to permit a person or enterprise to participate in proceedings where:
- it has a substantial interest in the outcome; and
- its participation is considered necessary in the public interest.
The Court found that the CCI had adequately recorded its satisfaction on these requirements.
BAI represented builders across India and its members were among the largest consumers of grey cement. Consequently, the Court held that BAI had a direct and substantial interest in proceedings concerning alleged anti-competitive conduct by cement manufacturers.
This is an important aspect of the judgment.
The Court did not treat “substantial interest” as synonymous with having a private legal right that would be adjudicated in the proceeding.Instead, the interest could arise from the party’s economic and consumer stake in the market affected by the alleged anti-competitive conduct.
Was the CCI reviewing its own earlier order?
This was perhaps the most interesting procedural objection.
UltraTech argued that once the CCI had rejected BAI’s impleadment application in December 2021, the Commission could not simply change its mind and allow a second application.
The Court rejected that argument because the two applications arose at materially different stages of the proceedings.
When the first application was rejected, the DG’s investigation was still pending.
When BAI made its second application, the DG had already completed the investigation and submitted his report.
More importantly, the Single Judge had expressly granted BAI liberty to approach the CCI afresh under Regulation 25 after completion of the investigation.
Therefore, according to the Division Bench, the later order permitting BAI’s participation was not a review of the earlier order.
The judgment thus highlights an important procedural principle:
A subsequent application arising from a materially changed stage of a regulatory proceeding is not necessarily a review merely because an earlier application on the same broad subject had been rejected.
What about natural justice?
UltraTech also argued that BAI’s impleadment application could not have been allowed without giving UltraTech an opportunity to oppose it.
The Court did not accept the argument in the facts of this case.
A crucial factor was that the CCI had already passed an order dated 6 October 2022 directing that BAI be provided the non-confidential version of the DG’s report and that BAI be permitted to present its opinion.
That order was also directed to be communicated to the opposite parties.
Thus, the Court found that UltraTech was already aware of BAI’s participation and of the disclosure of the non-confidential material well before the formal impleadment order of July 2023.
The Court therefore concluded that the plea of denial of natural justice could not succeed in the circumstances.
The larger principle: CCI proceedings are not ordinary civil litigation
This, in my view, is the most significant part of the judgment.
UltraTech effectively sought to invoke the familiar civil-law concept of dominus litis — the proposition that a plaintiff ordinarily has considerable control over whom it chooses to implead as a party.The Court rejected the analogy.
Why?
Because a competition proceeding is not a private dispute between two litigants.
The statutory purpose of the Competition Act is to prevent practices having an adverse effect on competition, promote and sustain competition, protect consumer interests and ensure freedom of trade. The Court, therefore, characterised proceedings before the CCI as proceedings undertaken primarily in the public interest, which means proceedings in rem rather than in personnem.
Consequently, an enterprise under investigation cannot claim to be the dominus litis in the way a plaintiff in an ordinary civil suit might. If a person or enterprise has a sufficient interest in the matter, and its participation can assist the CCI in arriving at a correct and just conclusion, the Commission can permit such participation.
But does “impleadment” mean unrestricted access? No..
The judgment makes an important distinction between participation and access to confidential information.
The Supreme Court had, in an earlier connected matter involving Dalmia Cement, recorded BAI’s undertaking that it would not seek inspection of documents marked confidential. The Delhi High Court noted that this undertaking substantially addressed the apprehension of prejudice to the cement manufacturers. The participation permitted to BAI was, therefore, confined to the non-confidential material and to presenting its opinion on the DG’s investigation report.
What does the judgment mean for competition-law practitioners?
The judgment potentially has significance beyond the cement sector.
It reinforces the proposition that the CCI has a degree of procedural flexibility to hear market participants, consumer bodies, trade associations or other persons having a substantial interest, where their participation advances the statutory objective of competition law. It also confirms that participation under Regulation 25 of the 2009 Regulations is not necessarily dependent upon demonstrating that the applicant possesses an independent cause of action or an adjudicable private right.
The focus is instead on: substantial interest + public interest + assistance to the Commission in reaching a correct conclusion.
At the same time, the judgment should not be read as creating an unrestricted right of intervention for every interested person. The power remains one that the CCI must exercise on being satisfied about the statutory/regulatory requirements, and the scope of participation can be specified by the Commission.
A broader shift in perspective?
The UltraTech judgment reflects an important conceptual feature of modern competition law. Competition proceedings are not merely about resolving disputes between competing businesses. They are about the functioning of markets.
That is why the Court’s observation that such proceedings are essentially directed towards protecting competition and consumers and furthering the public interest assumes considerable importance.
A consumer association that represents a substantial segment of the affected market may therefore bring a perspective that is relevant to the Commission’s assessment — even though it is not the original informant or an enterprise under investigation.
The takeaway
The Delhi High Court’s decision can therefore be distilled into four propositions:
1. A person having substantial interest in the outcome of a CCI proceeding may be permitted to participate under Regulation 25(1).
2. A fresh application at a materially different stage of the proceedings is not necessarily a review of an earlier rejection.
3. Participation in a competition proceeding does not automatically confer access to confidential information.
4. An enterprise facing a competition inquiry cannot claim the status of dominus litis; the ultimate objective of the proceeding is the protection of competition and public interest.
For competition-law practitioners, the judgment is a useful reminder that procedural participation before the CCI must ultimately be viewed through the lens of the statutory objectives of competition law, rather than solely through the prism of adversarial civil litigation.
Case: UltraTech Cement Ltd. v. Competition Commission of India & Anr., LPA 8/2024, decided by the Delhi High Court on 8 September 2026.
#CompetitionLaw #CCI #CompetitionCommissionOfIndia #Antitrust #Cartel #ConsumerProtection #DelhiHighCourt #CementIndustry #UltraTech
