Introduction
“The mixed economy framework was adopted in India in the early 1950s. Under this model, the government regulated certain sectors, while the private sector drove others. However, post-liberalisation in 1991, many government-run market players found themselves in direct competition with private enterprises. In liberalised economies, the state is expected to step back from direct economic participation and act as a neutral regulator. Yet, in India, Public Sector Undertakings (“PSUs”) continue to enjoy a kind of preferential treatment, even when the State is favouring opening up of sectors, such as, Defence , to private participation .
In the limited jurisprudence available on the issue, the landmark case of Coal India Limited (discussed below in detail) stands out as a rare instance, wherein a public sector undertaking was held to be abusing its dominant position by unilaterally dictating the terms of supply. Other cases involving entities like IRCTC and GETCO did not culminate in findings of abuse but highlighted the blurred lines between regulatory authority and commercial conduct in the public sector domain. The recent decision (or lack of it) by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Travel Agents Association of India (TAAI), also discussed in detail here, is another black spot in the development of jurisprudence on the subject in India. As a result, the issue of “competitive neutrality” has become crucial for ensuring a healthy competitive environment and fostering sustained economic growth and is worth discussing.”
The above quoted exercepts are based on my recent paper with the same title as in this blog , which has been recently published by the European Competition Law Review (ECLR) in its January , 2026 edition.
The paper is based on our inhouse research of consideration of all such cases of allegations of anti competitive conduct , including allegations of abuse of dominance by Public Sector Enterprises, by the Competition Commission of India or the appellate tribunals or the Supreme Court so far . The paper can be cited as (2026) 47 E.C.L.R., Issue 1 © 2025 Thomson Reuters and Contributors.
You may access the print friendly PDF version of this important Paper at
https://acrobat.adobe.com/id/urn:aaid:sc:AP:d41335ff-803e-41b6-8bea-a0eda78e6cd5
